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On the Economic Analysis of Smoking Bans
Michael R. Pakko
interests clash. The resolution of these conflicts
often results in legislation that exempts certain
types of businesses from these bans. Such compro-
mises represent a political outcome that reduces
the potential inefficiency and welfare losses that
might otherwise be imposed by more comprehen-
sive smoking prohibitions. However, the prevalence
of these exemptions, in turn, limits the applicability
of many studies to the more comprehensive legisla-
tion that has been proposed in many communities.
AGGREGATE ECONOMIC IMPACT
The consensus of the literature on the economic
effects of existing smoking regulations is that no
statistically significant impact on overall business
in a community can be ascertained.1 Some commu-
nities appear to experience a decline in sales or
I
n Missouri and across the nation, commu-
nities are debating the efficacy of banning
smoking in all public places, including
privately owned establishments. The policy
issues involved are multidimensional, but the
public debate is often summarized in terms of
public health versus economic impact. 
The focus of policymakers is often directed
toward considering the aggregate, or overall, eco-
nomic effects of smoking bans on business in a
community. Data on communitywide economic
activity are often readily available, and it might
seem that the overall effect of a public policy on
economic activity is the appropriate measure to
consider.
But it is also important to account for the distri-
butional impact and economic inefficiencies that
are often imposed by government intervention in
the market, particularly in cases where the proposed
policy imposes blanket restrictions. These differ-
ential effects reveal inefficiencies that are often
undetectable in analyses of aggregated data.
Distributional effects also contribute to the
political economy of smoking bans, as economic
This paper evaluates the literature on the economic effects of smoking bans. Many studies focus
exclusively on aggregate impact and thus may overlook the importance of distributional effects,
which reveal inefficiencies often undetectable in analyses of aggregated data. These effects also
account for the political economy of smoking bans, igniting controversy and public debate. The
political resolution often involves exemptions for certain types of establishments, which limits
the applicability of many existing studies to the more comprehensive smoking-ban proposals.
The paper also analyzes data from Maryville, Missouri—the first city in Missouri to ban smoking
in restaurants—to illustrate some of these points.
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1 Some of the more prominent studies include Huang et al. (1995),
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and McClusker (2004). A recent comprehensive survey is provided
by Scollo, Hyland, and Glantz (2003).
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          employment at restaurants and bars, while others
appear to experience an increase, at least over time.2
Some studies find no evidence of consumer-flight
to other locations, while others show some effect
on bordering communities.3 However, the statisti-
cal significance of these findings is often weak or
lacking.
There are a number of reasons that this con-
clusion is not very surprising. First, these studies
are necessarily conducted with limited data. Sample
periods are short, and detailed local data are often
scarce. Accordingly, it can be difficult to control
for the many possible idiosyncratic factors that may
affect economic outcomes without sacrificing some
ability to adequately test hypotheses (a statistical
problem known as “limited degrees of freedom”).
Moreover, the possibility that important variables
may have been omitted from the analysis implies
that the statistical significance of their conclusions
is often fragile (“omitted-variable bias”).
In addition, studies of the impact of smoking
bans necessarily focus on communities that are
among the first to implement such ordinances and
are therefore more likely to have a proportionately
smaller smoking population and/or fewer businesses
that would be adversely affected by a smoking ban.4
This introduces a source of “sample-selection bias”
that limits the general applicability of results, par-
ticularly in cases where demographic features differ
and policy proposals are more comprehensive or
restrictive than those examined in the literature.5
More importantly, basic consumer theory sug-
gests reasons that aggregate economic effects might
be limited: When an option is denied to consumers,
they tend to substitute other similar products and
services. A disruption in the availability or price
of a good can temporarily skew spending as con-
sumers reallocate their expenditures, but with the
ultimate effect of leaving their spending on broad
categories such as “entertainment” unchanged.
However, the lack of a measurable overall




When consumers are forced to reallocate their
spending, the notion of “revealed preference” tells
us that they are likely to be made worse-off in terms
of economic efficiency. In making choices about
their spending patterns, consumers reveal their
preferred consumption bundle. By eliminating
options available to consumers, a ban on an activity
forces them to choose a spending allocation that
could have been chosen before the ban, but was not.
This notion of economic welfare differs con-
siderably from the analysis implicit in many eco-
nomic studies of smoking bans, which present the
elimination of a risk as an unambiguous benefit
and the absence of a significant aggregate economic
effect as evidence that a smoking-ban policy would
be costless.6 Neither of these characterizations of
costs and benefits is complete, however.
Economists observe that individuals make
choices each day based on their preferences and
the options provided by the market. Those choices
frequently involve uncertainty and risk. People
make choices because the benefits they expect to
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2 In an early study of smoking bans, Glantz and Smith (1994) found
that, among 15 municipalities, there were two significant positive
effects and one significant negative effect on bar and restaurant sales.
Evans (1997) cited several methodological criticisms of that study
and found that nine cities in the sample were subject to significant
negative effects. A subsequent study by Glantz and Smith (1997)
showed two statistically significant positive effects and two signifi-
cant negative effects.
3 In a study of 239 cities in Massachusetts, Bartosch and Pope (2002)
found a statistically significant positive effect for cities bordered by
nonsmoking municipalities.
4 Glantz and Smith (1994) focus their analysis on the first 15 U.S.
cities to enact smoke-free ordinances affecting restaurants. The DHSS
study of Maryville, Missouri, considered in this paper (Cowan et al.,
2004) represents an analysis of “the first such ordinance in Missouri
to completely prohibit smoking in all restaurants.” Of the first nine
states to implement statewide bans, eight were below the U.S. median
with regard to percentage of smokers. In fact, the first two states to
adopt smoking bans, California and Utah, have the two lowest rates
of smoking prevalence in the nation, according to statistics from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (see Adams and Cotti,
2006).
5 More general methodological critiques of the literature include
Dunham and Marlow (2000) and Evans (1996 and 1997).
6 For example, Glantz and Smith (1997) conclude that “legislators
and government officials can enact health and safety regulations to
protect patrons and employees in restaurants and bars from the toxins
in secondhand tobacco smoke without fear of adverse economic
consequences” (p. 1690).gain are greater than the costs and risks involved.7
This is true whether the decision is about skydiving,
smoking cigarettes, or even working in or frequent-
ing establishments where they may be exposed to
secondhand smoke. Indeed, the act of driving a car
to pursue these activities presents grave risks. To
prohibit an activity simply because it involves risk
cannot be justified in economic terms. In fact,
government intervention can introduce inefficient
distortions into those market mechanisms that
efficiently deal with risk.
In our free market economy, the “invisible
hand” guides businesses to provide the goods and
services that consumers demand. For business
owners and their employees, the impact of a ban
can vary significantly, depending on their specific
clientele and their marketing strategies. It is some-
times argued that secondhand smoke imposes exter-
nal costs, requiring government intervention. But
in the case of private businesses—especially those
in the entertainment and hospitality sectors—the
profit motive provides a mechanism for business
owners to internalize those costs. Individuals assess
their own risks and benefits, but it is in the business
owner’s best interest to accommodate customers
and employees, smokers and nonsmokers alike.
Failure to do so is reflected in the bottom line.
As public attitudes have evolved, an increasing
number of restaurants and other entertainment
venues offer smoke-free environments.8 For exam-
ple, the St. Louis Coalition for Tobacco-Free
Missouri lists over 400 smoke-free restaurants (plus
multiple chain outlets) in the St. Louis area.9 Mean-
while, some businesses continue to accommodate
smokers and nonsmokers with distinct and separate
settings under strictly regulated standards, while
others offer venues for a clientele that expects a
smoke-filled atmosphere. Each proprietor is making
a careful business decision about how to best fill a
niche in the market and make a profit in the process.
The increasing number of establishments choos-
ing to go smoke-free reveals that the market is
responsive to people’s changing attitudes. As con-
sumers demand smoke-free options, businesses find
it advantageous to provide them. A government
regulation that attempts to force the market toward
a new equilibrium, however, is likely to impose
transitional costs and/or long-term hardships on
many individual businesses.
A number of economic studies have examined
these distributional effects. Because detailed data
are often limited, much of the research on differen-
tial impacts comes from the results of surveys that
assess attitudes and expectations.10 The pattern of
these effects is not surprising. Proprietors and
customers of businesses such as bars, bingo halls,
bowling alleys, billiard parlors, and casinos tend
to express greater concerns about revenue losses
from smoking bans. Family-oriented restaurants,
chain outlets, fast-food restaurants, and take-out
establishments are generally considered less likely
to be adversely affected by smoking bans.
Survey results reveal that bar owners perceive
a particularly significant threat to their business.
In one nationwide survey of restaurant and bar
owners, 39 percent of restaurant owners expected
revenue losses after a smoking ban, while 83 per-
cent of bar owners expected losses.11
Among bar and restaurant customers, smokers
(who tend to spend more than nonsmokers) are
more likely to decrease their patronage after a
smoking ban, whereas nonsmokers (who are more
numerous) are more likely to increase their patron-
age. The overall effect of these tendencies on over-
all restaurant and bar sales is a subject of debate.12
Differential impacts on bars and restaurants are
evident, however. For example, a survey in
Massachusetts found that 44 percent of smokers
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7 A seminal article on the topic of risky choices is Friedman and
Savage (1948). Viscusi (1992) applies risk analysis to the specific
issue of smoking. See also Lemieux (2000) and Petkantchin (2005).
8 Brooks and Mucci (2001) present evidence of changing attitudes
toward smoking in restaurants among adult survey respondents in
Massachusetts.
9 See www.breatheeasymo.org/directory.asp?coal=15.
10 Survey data are often treated with skepticism by economists, but they
can provide relevant information about preferences and therefore,
by implication, about economic welfare. Prominent studies of this
type include Beiner and Siegel (1997), Dunham and Marlow (2000),
Brooks and Mucci (2000), and Tang et al. (2003).
11 Dunham and Marlow (2000).
12 For example, Corsun, Young, and Enz (1996) found that smokers in
New York City were eating out less after a restaurant smoking ban, but
that nonsmokers were eating out more often, resulting in a positive
impact on restaurant industry revenues. In a subsequent rejoinder,
Evans (1996) raised methodological criticisms and recalculated the
net effect to be negative.  predicted decreased patronage at bars, while 24.5
percent of nonsmokers predicted increased patron-
age. The proportions for restaurant patronage were
significantly different, with only 32 percent of
smokers reporting decreased patronage and 37.7
percent of nonsmokers reporting increased patron-
age.13 This finding is consistent with greater con-
cerns about revenue losses expressed by bar owners
than by restaurant owners.14
Among studies that have examined detailed
sales data after smoking bans, one found that the
revenues of bars in Corvallis, Oregon, that offer
video poker suffered significant revenue losses.15
A recent study of gaming in Delaware after a smok-
ing ban found a revenue decline of approximately
15 percent at racetrack casinos in that state.16 One
prominent study of bar sales in several municipal-
ities that had imposed smoking bans showed mixed
results, but found that the only statistically signifi-
cant case showed a negative effect on bar sales rela-
tive to a comparison city.17 A recent comprehensive
study of bars and pubs in Ontario found significant
declines in sales—over 23 percent in Ottawa, where
a comprehensive smoking ban was implemented
in September 2001.18 Several sources document
declines in alcohol sales following smoking bans.19
The overall change in overall employment at
bars and restaurants is another measure of economic
activity that is often considered. Just as is the case
for aggregate sales figures, overall employment data
often show no significant effects from smoking
bans.20 One recent study of hospitality-industry
employment in New York City found a negative
effect on restaurant employment and a positive
effect for hotels. Neither effect was significant,
however.21 Local data and anecdotes that are more
specific to subsets of businesses in a community
tend to suggest employment losses. For example, a
coalition of pub and bar owners in Ottawa, Ontario,
estimated a loss of 230 jobs among their members in
the first two months of a smoking ban in that city.22
As smoking bans proliferate across the nation,
county-level employment data have provided useful
information about the economic impact of smoking
bans. By using pooled data covering the entire
United States, Adams and Cotti (2006) and Phelps
(2006) have been able to increase the statistical
power of tests for economic impact. Both studies
find little effect on employment at restaurants after
a smoking ban is implemented, although Adams
and Cotti find that restaurants in warm-weather
climates tend to fare better than those in colder
regions of the country. With respect to bar employ-
ment, both studies find statistically significant
losses that range from 5 percent to 17 percent.23
Here again, however, the notion of revealed
preference is informative. In the disruption imposed
by a smoking ban, some workers will find them-
selves dislocated. Most will find new employment
quickly, one hopes. But by their revealed preference,
we can deduce that these employees considered the
costs and benefits of their employment—including
the potential health risks that their job entails—
and chose not to find an alternative. A government
ban will force some of these individuals to do so.
The increasing number of smoke-free venues
provides options for employees as well as cus-
tomers. The motivation to retain good workers
provides an incentive for proprietors to offer accom-
modating work environments. In the process, rela-
tive risks and returns of employment options can
be efficiently allocated by the market.
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13 Biener and Siegel (1997).
14 Proprietors of billiard parlors and pool halls have expressed concerns
that are similar to those of bar owners.  See Fabrizio et al. (1995).
15 Dresser et al. (1999).
16 Pakko (2006 and forthcoming). These findings contradict earlier
estimates by Mandel, Alamar, and Glantz (2005).
17 Glantz and Smith (1997).
18 Evans (2005); smoking bans in London, Kingston, and Kitchener,
Ontario, that have been implemented more recently were also found
to be associated with significant declines in bar and pub sales.
19 For example, Clower and Weinstein (2004) report a sharp decline in
alcoholic beverage sales in Dallas following the implementation of
a comprehensive smoking ban, in contrast to increasing sales around
the state. Thalheimer (2005) found similar effects for Lexington,
Kentucky. An association of pub and bar owners in Ottawa, Ontario,
reported statistics from the Brewers of Ontario that beer sales declined
10.5 percent in Ottawa during the first eight months of the smoking
ban in that city (PUBCO, 2002). The decline in Ottawa beer sales is
also reported in Bourns and Malcomson (2002).
20 See, for example, Hyland, Cummings, and Lubin (2000).
21 Hyland et al. (2003). 
22 PUBCO (2001).
23 The employment data used in these studies report only the number
of employees. There may be additional effects on the number of
hours worked that would not be revealed in these analyses.POLITICAL ECONOMY
Among businesses, comprehensive smoking
bans tilt the economic playing field in ways that
are fundamental to the political economy of the
issue: Establishments that cater to a largely smoking
clientele are likely to be opposed to a ban, and those
who explicitly cater to a nonsmoking customer base
might be driven to oppose it—to protect their own
market niche. Businesses in communities that have
a relatively high proportion of smokers relative to
nonsmokers will be opposed to regional smoking
bans, as will businesses and municipalities border-
ing communities that have not adopted a smoking
ban. Many establishments that would be largely
unaffected might be inclined to stay on the side-
lines of the debate.
Tavern and bar owners have been among the
most vociferous opponents of a complete ban on
smoking. Existing empirical evidence supports the
casual observation that bars stand to suffer a greater
threat of revenue losses from smoking bans than do
restaurants in general. This differentiation is evident
in the political dynamics of public debate on smok-
ing bans. It also explains the tendency of many
community smoking bans to include exemptions
for stand-alone bars or other establishments that
receive a high proportion of their revenues in
alcohol sales relative to food sales. In many local
ordinances, exemptions also exist for bowling alleys,
bingo halls, fraternal organizations, and the like.
These political compromises arise in response
to the economic pressures that drive particular
businesses to actively oppose smoking-ban ordi-
nances. Those who are most threatened by any
public policy proposal tend to be more adamant
in their opposition and are more likely to have their
interests accommodated in final legislation.24
Exemptions represent something of a second-best
outcome (achieved through the political process
rather than through market mechanisms) for miti-
gating the most economically disruptive effects of
a proposed public policy. 
The prevalence of such exemptions in existing
smoking ordinances reflects underlying economic
pressures and provides indirect evidence of the
potential adverse effects of more comprehensive
smoking-ban proposals. In fact, the resources that
businesses expend on their opposition to smok-
ing bans, and their lobbying efforts to obtain
exemptions, represent direct costs of smoking-ban
proposals—whether or not they are ultimately
implemented.
The fact that many local ordinances have
exempted bars and other establishments is also an
important consideration for interpreting previous
studies of the effects of smoking bans on bar and
restaurant sales. These studies have often consid-
ered communities with ordinances that contain
numerous exemptions. The applicability of many
of these case studies to contemporary policy




On June 9, 2003, Maryville, Missouri, adopted
an ordinance that prohibited smoking in restau-
rants.26 An examination of the first year of the
smoking ban, recently released by the Missouri
Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS),
presents data on taxable sales receipts for Maryville
that span a period of over five years before and one
year after the implementation of the ordinance.27
The study is being widely distributed and presented
as evidence in support of similar (and more restric-
tive) bans in other communities.
The authors of the DHSS study state at the out-
set that their findings are “consistent with those
from studies of smoke-free ordinances in other U.S.
cities”—namely, that no “detrimental changes” in
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24 An alternative explanation of this feature of the political economy
of smoking bans is that the hospitality industry has been duped into
supporting the interests of a powerful tobacco company lobby. See,
for example, Dearlove, Bialous, and Glantz (2002).
25 Indeed, one study (Goldstein and Sobel, 1998) is widely cited as
showing that “even in the number one tobacco-producing state in the
US, ETS regulations present no adverse economic impact” (p. 286).
However, it considered only the effects of requiring separate smoking
and nonsmoking sections in restaurants. A recent citation is in Scollo,
Hyland, and Glantz (2003).
26 Maryville City Council (2003).
27 Cowan et al. (2004).total bar and restaurant revenue were observed after
the ordinance was implemented. However, after
comparing the growth rates for sales of eating and
drinking establishments (standard industrial clas-
sification [SIC] code 581) with total retail sales in
Maryville—and with corresponding data for the
state of Missouri—and noting that eating and drink-
ing establishment sales in Maryville rose sharply
in the final two quarters of the study, the authors
conclude that “the ordinance may have been bene-
ficial for this area of business.”
The purpose of the present study is to subject
the data from the DHSS study to a more rigorous
statistical analysis. Using the data reported in the
DHSS study, I have applied basic linear regression
techniques to test the hypothesis that the smoking
ban had no significant effect on Maryville bar and
restaurant sales. Of particular interest as well is
the alternative hypothesis that the ordinance had
“beneficial” effects. 
An investigation of developments in the
Maryville economy turned up an important addi-
tional factor that is included in the analysis: the
opening of a new, popular restaurant chain outlet
during the sample period. That factor appears to
be more relevant for explaining total restaurant
and bar sales in Maryville than the smoking ban.
Analysis of the Maryville Data
Figure 1 presents the data for eating and drink-
ing establishments in Maryville, as reported in the
DHSS study. The sample period runs from the first
quarter of 1998 through the second quarter of 2004.
As noted by the authors of the DHSS study, a trend
and seasonal variation are important features of
the data series. A sharp increase in sales at the end
of the sample period is also evident.
The first line of Table 1 reports a summary of
the regression results that were used to generate
the trend line and seasonally adjusted estimates
illustrated in Figure 1. The regression includes
only a constant, a linear time trend, and quarterly
dummy variables for quarters 2, 3, and 4.28 It shows
that sales at eating and drinking establishments
grew at an average quarterly rate of 0.77 percent
over the sample period and that seasonal variation
generated more than 7
1/2 percent quarterly variation
over a typical year.29 As a measure of fit, the
adjusted R
2 statistic suggests that the regression
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Actual and Fitted Values for the Trend Equation (Fitted Time-Trend and Seasonal Effects Only)
28 The first quarter serves as the baseline for seasonality of the 
regression.
29 Although the coefficient on quarter 2 is the only individually signifi-
cant seasonal variable, F-tests of the joint significance of the sea-
sonal dummies showed them to be significant in all of the
specifications reported in this paper (with exceptions noted).explains nearly two-thirds of the variation in
Maryville bar and restaurant sales.30,31
Line 2 shows the results when a dummy vari-
able for the smoking ban is included in the regres-
sion. The dummy variable takes on a value of 1 in
the final four quarters of the sample period and is
zero before. The point estimate of the coefficient
on this variable indicates that sales at eating and
drinking establishments in Maryville were more
than 7
1/2 percent higher during the smoking ban
than trend growth and seasonal variation would
predict.32 This estimate is significant at the stan-
dard 95 percent confidence level. According to
this initial evaluation of the effect of the smoking
ban in Maryville, the DHSS conclusions appear to
be supported. The inclusion of a dummy variable
covering the period of the smoking ban improves
the overall fit of the equation, and its coefficient
estimate is positive and significant.
As an illustration of this finding, Figure 2 shows
a plot of the actual and predicted values from the
regressions with the smoking-ban dummy variable
included. After controlling for the smoking ban, the
unexplained increase in the final two quarters of
the sample is still present, but its prominence is
diminished. However, sales in the first two quarters
of the smoking ban now appear to be considerably
lower than the values predicted by the estimation
equation. In fact, the last four residuals from this
equation are outliers, the first two negative and
the last two positive.
Results such as this are often fragile. First, the
significance of the dummy variable indicates that
a correspondence exists in the data, but it does not
establish causality. More importantly, findings are
often subject to omitted-variable bias. If an impor-
tant independent influence has been excluded from
the analysis, the results can be misleading.
In the following sections, I consider the inclu-
sion of additional data series to control for changes
in overall economic conditions in Maryville and
Missouri. First, investigation into the local eco-
nomic environment in Maryville yielded informa-
tion about one important idiosyncratic event that
is relevant to the analysis: the opening of a new
Applebee’s in town.
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Table 1
Trend Analysis
[Dependent Variable = ln(E&D_Maryville)]
Constant Trend Q2 Q3 Q4 SmokeBan Applebee’s Adjusted R2 Q
1 14.8858** 0.0077** 0.0726** 0.0387 0.0376 0.6595 6.4060†
(0.0225) (0.0012) (0.0245) (0.0255) (0.0255)
2 14.9024** 0.0055** 0.0749** 0.0369 0.0381 0.0752* 0.7368 3.2281
(0.0207) (0.0014) (0.0216) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0281)
3 14.8993** 0.0056** 0.0623** 0.0512** 0.0523** 0.1755** 0.8548 1.0313
(0.0149) (0.0009) (0.0161) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0325)
4 14.9020** 0.0052** 0.0637** 0.0497** 0.0512** 0.0172 0.1605** 0.8507 0.9895
(0.0156) (0.0010) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0256) (0.0398)
NOTE: */** Indicates significant at the 95/99 percent levels. †Q-statistic indicates the presence of autocorrelated residuals.
30 The equation actually explains a greater proportion of the variation:
The unadjusted R2 is 0.714. The adjusted R2 penalizes the inclusion
of superfluous explanatory variables and is a particularly relevant
measure of fit for small samples in which degrees of freedom are
limited.
31 Tests of the residuals from this baseline trend/seasonal specification
suggested the presence of serially correlated residuals. Subsequent
analysis showed that this was an artifact of the outlying observations
at the end of the sample period. Serial correlation was not detected
in specifications that included dummy variables for end-of-period
effects.
32 The coefficient on a dummy variable in a semilogarithmic equation
such as this provides only an approximation to the percentage effect.
For a coefficient value ß, the true percentage effect is exp(ß)–1. In
this case, the calculated value is 7.81 percent. See Halvorsen and
Palmquist (1980).The Applebee’s Effect
In mid-February 2004 (halfway through the third
quarter of the smoking ban), Applebee’s opened a
new franchise in Maryville. According to local news
reports, it has been a phenomenal success. In a
report on the restaurant’s one-year anniversary,
the Maryville Daily Forum quotes the company’s
vice president of operations for Applebee’s parent
company as saying that “Maryville has been one of
the busiest stores in the country since its opening.
We call it our crown jewel.”33
Maryville is a fairly small town, with a resident
population of 11,000. It has only 37 restaurants and
bars. It is quite conceivable that the opening of a
new, popular restaurant chain outlet would have a
significant independent effect on the town’s total
bar and restaurant sales.
To test for the influence of the “Applebee’s
effect,” I constructed a variable that takes on a value
of 1 in the second quarter of 2004 and 2 in the first
quarter (since Applebee’s opened midway through
the quarter). The results of including this variable
in the basic trend regression equation are reported
in line 3 of Table 1. The Applebee’s variable is highly
significant, with a point estimate that suggests it
accounts for a 19.2 percent increase in Maryville
bar and restaurant sales in the second quarter of
2004 (along with a 9.6 increase in the first quarter).34
With both the smoking ban and Applebee’s
dummy variables included in the regression (line 4),
the Applebee’s effect accounts for an increase of
more than 17 percent above trend at the end of the
sample period—an effect that remains highly sig-
nificant. The coefficient on the smoking-ban dummy
is small and is not statistically significant. In fact,
the fit of the regression deteriorates when adding
the smoking-ban dummy variable to the equation
that already includes the Applebee’s variable
(lines 3 and 4).
Figure 3 illustrates this result, showing the
actual and fitted values from the regression that
includes the Applebee’s variable (line 3). Compared
with Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 clearly shows that
the inclusion of the Applebee’s variable effectively
accounts for the surge in restaurant and bar sales in
the first two quarters of 2004, leaving little addi-
tional variation for which the smoking-ban dummy
variable can account.
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Actual and Fitted Values for the Trend Equation (Including the Smoking-Ban Effect)
33 Goff (2005).
34 These figures are related to the actual coefficient estimates using
the method described in footnote 32.The regressions reported in Table 1 include no
controls for overall economic conditions. This is
another potentially important source of omitted-
variable bias in the results, particularly because
the sample period includes a national economic
recession. A number of variables were applied to
the analysis to better control for economic condi-
tions. The results, reported in the appendix, were
all broadly consistent with the trend analysis pre-
sented in Table 1.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this analysis of the Maryville
data suggest no significant effect of the smoking ban
on bar and restaurant sales. The evident increase
in sales near the end of the sample period more
closely corresponds to the opening of the new
Applebee’s in town than it does to the implemen-
tation of the smoking ban. Although these findings
do not establish causality, a consideration of the
particular demographics and the limited scope of
the ordinance in this case suggest that any claims
about the smoking ban having beneficial effects
on bar and restaurant sales in Maryville cannot
reasonably be substantiated.
These results illustrate many of the points
raised in the first section of this paper. First, the
sample period is short. With only 26 observations,
limited degrees of freedom make it difficult to test
hypotheses with a high degree of confidence. The
sharp increase in Maryville bar and restaurant sales
in the first two quarters of 2004 is an unusually
prominent outlier in the data, so it is more readily
associated with statistically significant effects. The
key issue is resolving the source of those effects.
More generally, it is not surprising that a smok-
ing ban like the one in Maryville would have no
measurable impact on the city’s total bar and restau-
rant sales. Consumers tend to substitute similar
expenditures when one set of consumption options
is restricted. Spending patterns can change with-
out having a significant impact on broad spending
categories such as “entertainment” or on specific
categories such as “sales revenues of eating and
drinking establishments.”
But the lack of aggregate effects does not pre-
clude the existence of significant distributional
effects. It is generally acknowledged that some
businesses are likely to be affected more than others
by a smoking ban. The owners of businesses who
are likely to be most severely affected tend to raise
the loudest objections and are therefore more likely
Pakko










Actual and Fitted Values for the Trend Equation (Including the Applebee’s Effect)to be granted exemptions. It is no accident that bars
are often exempted from smoking bans.
In Maryville, the ordinance exempts stand-
alone bars. It exempts seven establishments by
name and also excludes any other businesses that
receive more than 60 percent of their revenues from
alcohol sales.35 By excluding bars, the Maryville
City Council mitigated some adverse economic
impacts that might have occurred under a compre-
hensive ban. The specific exemptions included in
the ordinance suggest that it represented a political
compromise that accommodated concerns raised
by local business owners.
Indeed, the Maryville ordinance affected very
few businesses at all. According to the Missouri
Tobacco Use Prevention Program (2002), 70 percent
of the restaurants in Maryville were smoke-free
well before the ban. Assuming that figure excludes
bars that were exempted, the ordinance affected
no more than nine restaurants. It would be very
surprising to find that the smoking ban had any
significant effect on total bar and restaurant sales
in Maryville.
This observation points to a more general reason
for exercising caution in extrapolating the findings
from this type of study to an evaluation of policy
proposals in other municipalities. Studies of the
impact of smoking bans necessarily focus on com-
munities that are among the first to implement such
ordinances, and which are therefore more likely
to have a lower proportional smoking population
and/or a smaller number of businesses that would
be adversely affected by the proposed ban. This
type of sample-selection bias limits the general
applicability of results, particularly in cases where
demographic features differ and public policy
proposals are more comprehensive and restrictive
than the Maryville ordinance.
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Including Economic Controls in the Maryville Regressions
Table A1 presents results that include two economic control variables used in the DHSS study. The
first panel includes a variable that is constructed by subtracting eating and drinking sales from total retail
sales in Maryville.36 Although the coefficient on this variable is significant in only one of the equations
reported, it is jointly significant with the linear time trend in all four specifications. Comparisons with
Table 1 show that including this economic control variable provides for a slightly improved fit. However,
the conclusions to be drawn from this specification are the same as before: The smoking-ban dummy
variable is positive and significant if included alone, but the Applebee’s variable provides for a much
better fit, and the smoking ban has no significant influence after controlling for the Applebee’s effect.
The second panel of Table A1 reports the results of including a variable for sales at eating and drinking
establishments for the rest of Missouri (Missouri minus Maryville). Again, although the coefficient on this
variable is not individually significant, it is jointly significant with the time trend. However, the seasonal
effects were found to be individually and jointly insignificant in all four specifications. Evidently, the sea-
sonal pattern in total Missouri bar and restaurant sales is able to adequately capture the seasonal variation
in Maryville’s sales in this regression. In light of this finding, the third panel of Table A1 presents the
results of excluding the seasonal dummy variables.
Again, the slightly better fit of these equations relative to the trend specifications in Table 1 shows
that bar and restaurant sales in the rest of Missouri help to explain the Maryville sales pattern. When it is
included in this specification, the Applebee’s variable continues to be highly significant. However, the
smoking-ban dummy variable is no longer significant, even when the Applebee’s effect is not considered.37
As an additional robustness check, I obtained data on employment and unemployment for Nodaway
County for use as alternative control variables for local economic conditions.38 Table A2 reports the results
of including these data in the regressions. The first panel shows the results of including (the natural log
of) Nodaway County employment. The second panel considers the Nodaway County unemployment rate
as a control variable. The regressions including the unemployment rate proved the best overall for fit of
all the specifications considered. The findings reinforce those reported in Table A1: The Applebee’s effect
unambiguously dominates the smoking-ban effect. When the Nodaway county unemployment rate is used
as an explanatory variable, the smoking-ban dummy is not significant, even when included alone.39
All of the regressions considered above use the log of Maryville bar and restaurant sales as the dependent
variable. Two alternative ratios were also considered: The first is the ratio of Maryville eating and drinking
establishment sales to total retail sales. The second is the ratio of eating and drinking establishment sales
in Maryville relative to the eating and drinking establishment sales for Missouri.40
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36 This difference was included in the regression instead of total Maryville retail sales because the total includes the dependent variable. Inclusion
of the total would therefore introduce a problematic correlation of the regressor with the residuals.
37 In the specification that excludes seasonal factors, the smoking-ban dummy variable is very near the significance threshold.
38 The data are quarterly averages of monthly figures, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
39 In the specification that includes the smoking-ban dummy variable alone, evidence of serially correlated errors remains. The inclusion of an
autoregressive error specification did not alter the overall results, however. In fact, the AR(1) error specification had the effect of reducing the
size of the coefficient on the smoking-ban dummy variable. 
40 The use of these ratios as dependent variables can be thought of as imposing ex ante restrictions on the relationships considered in Table 2.
Following Glantz and Smith (1994 and 1997) analysis of these types of ratios have been widely used in the literature on the economic effects of
smoking bans. Evans (1997) points out the use of ratios can be misleading when the numerator is relatively large. However, Maryville bar and
restaurant sales comprise only about 10 percent of total Maryville retail sales and only 0.23 percent of Missouri bar and restaurant sales.Pakko
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Table A1
Trend Analysis Using Sales Data to Control for Economic Factors
[Dependent Variable = ln(E&D_Maryville)]
Constant Trend X Q2 Q3 Q4 SmokeBan Applebee’s Adjusted R2 Q
A. X = ln(Total_Maryville – E&D_Maryville)
1 4.4048 0.0019 0.6152 0.0386 –0.0209 –0.0640 0.6923 4.5727†
(5.8283) (0.0034) (0.3421) (0.0300) (0.0410) (0.0615)
2 2.9130 –0.0014 0.7039* 0.0362 –0.0314 –0.0781 0.0813** 0.7908 0.0907 
(4.8276) (0.0030) (0.2834) (0.0247) (0.0340) (0.0509) (0.0252)
3 9.7845* 0.0029 0.3002 0.0463* 0.0214 0.0018 0.1646** 0.8588 0.3858 
(4.0943) (0.0023) (0.2403) (0.0204) (0.0291) (0.0437) (0.0332)
4 8.2930 0.0015 0.3880 0.0441* 0.0101 –0.0149 0.0296 0.1355** 0.8610 0.0398 
(4.2689) (0.0026) (0.2506) (0.0203) (0.0305) (0.0458) (0.0260) (0.0417)
B1. X = ln(E&D_Missouri – E&D_Maryville) 
1 –10.3031 –0.0014 1.2051 –0.0829 –0.1397 –0.0364 0.6981 3.5275 
(13.1294) (0.0049) (0.6281) (0.0843) (0.0960) (0.0454)
2 5.1811 0.0023 0.4649 0.0145 –0.0317 0.0095 0.0626 0.7288 3.2178 
(15.1076) (0.0051) (0.7226) (0.0964) (0.1089) (0.0500) (0.0346)
3 5.7685 0.0024 0.4368 0.0066 –0.0143 0.0245 0.1642** 0.8540 1.0627 
(9.7439) (0.0035) (0.4661) (0.0616) (0.0719) (0.0341) (0.0347)
4 7.1627 0.0027 0.3701 0.0157 –0.0049 0.0283 0.0076 0.1593** 0.8464 1.0788 
(11.3809) (0.0038) (0.5443) (0.0725) (0.0822) (0.0379) (0.0296) (0.0404)
B2. X = ln(E&D_Missouri – E&D_Maryville) - without seasonals
1 6.3462* 0.0048** 0.4086** 0.6720 3.3851 
(3.0451) (0.0016) (0.1451)
2 7.1113* 0.0032 0.3728* 0.0612 0.7132 1.0364 
(2.8715) (0.0017) (0.1368) (0.0295)
3 7.2297** 0.0030* 0.3673** 0.1645** 0.8428 0.0003 
(2.1155) (0.0012) (0.1008) (0.0323)
4 7.2746** 0.0029* 0.3652** 0.0053 0.1604** 0.8356 0.0018 
(2.1743) (0.0013) (0.1036) (0.0261) (0.0385)
NOTE: */** Indicates significance at the 95/99 percent level. †Q-statistic indicates the presence of autocorrelated residuals.Table A3 presents the results of regressions using these ratio-dependent variables. A downward trend
is found for the ratio of bar and restaurant sales relative to total retail sales in Maryville, but no trend is
evident in the ratio of sales in Maryville relative to Missouri. Seasonal effects are significant in both sets
of regressions, indicating that seasonal patterns in Maryville bar and restaurant sales differ from total retail
sales in Maryville and from bar and restaurant sales for the state of Missouri.41
The first panel, using the ratio of bar and restaurant sales relative to total retail sales in Maryville as
the dependent variable, shows that the effect of the smoking-ban dummy is positive and highly significant
when included without the Applebee’s variable in the regression. However, the Applebee’s effect again
provides for a better fit, and it remains significant (whereas the smoking-ban dummy does not) when both
are included in the regression.42
The second panel of Table A3 reports the results of using the ratio of bar and restaurant sales for
Maryville to bar and restaurant sales for Missouri as the dependent variable. In this set of regressions, the
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Table A2
Trend Analysis Using Employment Data to Control for Economic Factors
[Dependent Variable = ln(E&D_Maryville)]
Constant Trend X Q2 Q3 Q4 SmokeBan Applebee’s Adjusted R2 Q
A. X = ln(Nodaway Employment)
1 13.1760** 0.0066** 0.6729 0.0665* 0.0622 0.0251 0.6748 5.3472†
(1.2127) (0.0014) (0.4772) (0.0243) (0.0300) (0.0265)
2 13.9639** 0.0051** 0.3687 0.0713** 0.0499 0.0312 0.0682* 0.7322 3.1574
(1.1526) (0.0015) (0.4528) (0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0242) (0.0296)
3 14.2822** 0.0052** 0.2427 0.0604** 0.0592** 0.0473* 0.1691** 0.8513 0.8511
(0.8496) (0.0010) (0.3341) (0.0165) (0.0203) (0.0184) (0.0340)
4 14.3714** 0.0050** 0.2085 0.0619** 0.0569* 0.0470* 0.0143 0.1576** 0.8456 0.8619 
(0.8817) (0.0011) (0.3464) (0.0170) (0.0211) (0.0188) (0.0265) (0.0408)
B. X = Nodaway Unemployment Rate
1 15.0337** 0.0107** –0.0907** 0.0369 0.0127 –0.0336 0.7502 5.9226†
(0.0539) (0.0014) (0.0309) (0.0243) (0.0235) (0.0326)
2 15.0110** 0.0084** –0.0695* 0.0468 0.0175 –0.0166 0.0537 0.7814 4.2901†
(0.0517) (0.0018) (0.0308) (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0317) (0.0273)
3 14.9697** 0.0073** –0.0444 0.0463* 0.0366 0.0153 0.1494** 0.8694 1.5735 
(0.0416) (0.0013) (0.0247) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0261) (0.0340)
(4.) 14.9687** 0.0070** –0.0427 0.0478* 0.0362 0.0159 0.0111 0.1406** 0.8637 1.6207 
(0.0426) (0.0015) (0.0255) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0267) (0.0247) (0.0398)
NOTE: */** Indicates significance at the 95/99 percent level. †Q-statistic indicates the presence of autocorrelated residuals.
41 Given the insignificance of seasonable dummy variables reported in Panel B1 of Table 2, this finding indicates that seasonal sales patterns in
Maryville are different from, but have a predictable relationship to, total Missouri bar and restaurant sales. This is likely attributable to the
nature of Maryville as a college town, home to Northwest Missouri State University.
42 The ratio of bar and restaurant sales to total sales for the state of Missouri was considered as an additional explanatory variable, but its inclusion
did not improve the overall fit of the regression, nor did it alter any of the results of hypothesis tests.
43 Two ratios were considered as additional explanatory variables for this specification: Total retail sales for Maryville relative to the state of
Missouri and Nodaway employment relative to Missouri employment. Neither variable improved the fit of the equation or altered the results.smoking-ban dummy variable is not significant even when included in the absence of the Applebee’s effect.
The Applebee’s dummy variable is highly significant with or without controlling for the effect of the smoking
ban. When both variables are included in the regression, the coefficient on the smoking-ban dummy is
negative, but insignificant.
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Table A3
Analysis of Ratios
Constant Trend Q2 Q3 Q4 SmokeBan Applebee’s Adjusted R2 Q
A. Dependent Variable = (E&D_Maryville/Total_Maryville) × 100
1 10.4377** –0.0152 0.1605 –0.5295* –1.1162** 0.6112 3.2560 
(0.1944) (0.0104) (0.2115) (0.2199) (0.2202)
2 10.6060** –0.0383** 0.1837 –0.5477** –1.1113** 0.7658** 0.7414 0.0787 
(0.1660) (0.0108) (0.1726) (0.1794) (0.1795) (0.2251)
3 10.5365** –0.0311** 0.0846 –0.4377* –1.0085** 1.2854** 0.7662 0.0861 
(0.1529) (0.0090) (0.1652) (0.1722) (0.1730) (0.3327)
4 10.6037** –0.0396** 0.1206 –0.4756** –1.0379** 0.4401 0.9008* 0.7895 0.4627 
(0.1498) (0.0098) (0.1580) (0.1647) (0.1649) (0.2455) (0.3816)
B. Dependent Variable = (E&D_Maryville/E&D_Missouri) × 100
1 0.2431** 0.0001 –0.0133* –0.0253** –0.0057 0.4321 4.0358†
(0.0049) (0.0003) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0056)
2 0.2457** –0.0003 –0.0129* –0.0256** –0.0056 0.0118 0.4854 2.7680 
(0.0049) (0.0003) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0066)
3 0.2459** –0.0004 –0.0154** –0.0228** –0.0027 0.0357** 0.7130 0.9435 
(0.0035) (0.0002) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0077)
4 0.2456** –0.0003 –0.0155** –0.0226** –0.0026 –0.0016 0.0371** 0.6989 0.8795 
(0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0095)
NOTE: */** Indicates significance at the 95/99 percent level. †Q-statistic indicates the presence of autocorrelated residuals.